Basel III and its Impacts on International Swedish Banks by Kerman, Marika
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basel III and Its Impacts on International Swedish Banks 
 
Marika Kerman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 %DFKHORU·V7KHVLV  
DP in International Business 
 2012 
    Abstract 
 
 
    26.9.2012 
 
Degree Programme in International Business 
 
 
Author 
Marika Kerman 
Group or year of 
entry 
2009 
Title of report 
Basel III and its Impacts on International Swedish Banks 
Number of 
pages  
50  
Supervisors 
Mika Mustikainen, Maija Suonpää 
 
This thesis will present the Basel III framework and discuss its possible implications 
on the banking industry, focusing specifically on the Swedish banking industry. 
There will also be an analysis of two Swedish banks, Handelsbanken and Nordea to 
map their readiness to comply with the Basel III requirements. The objective of this 
thesis was to gain in-depth knowledge of the current framework still in progress, of 
its final development and implementation. The two banks were examined to 
compare the impacts on the chosen banks. TKHDXWKRU·VSURIHVVLRQDOEDFNJURXQG
and personal interests were also behind the choise of topic. The thesis process 
began late in the spring of 2012 and the main methods used were collecting 
information from several reliable publications and making conclusions based on the 
gained information. The results of the thesis show that the Basel III framework has 
serious effects on the whole banking industry. Positive impacts include for instance 
increased financial stability. However possible additional costs may also occur due 
to up-coming changes in the banks. The banks analyzed, Handelsbanken and 
Nordea, proved to be extremely well equipped to comply with the Basel III 
requirements even though the Swedish government will most likely require higher 
requirements than proposed by the Basel III framework. This is justified due to the 
higher risks related to the Swedish banking industry compared to the European 
level, which is also discussed in the research. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Objectives and Methods 
The objectives of this thesis were to find out if the Basel III framework has signifi-
cance importance on the chosen banks and how in general it will affect the banking 
industry. These objectives were chosen to gain information of the important concept 
causing changes in the global banking industry. 
  
Qualitative research was used to conduct the thesis work. The author justifies the 
choice of the research method by Ghauri & Gronhaug (2010) who mention that with 
the qualitative method, the emphasis is on understanding the phenomenon and that is 
exactly the purpose of this thesis work. It is also said that µthe experience of the re-
searcher plays an important role in thHDQDO\VLVRIWKHGDWDµ*KDuri & Gronhaug 2010) 
and the author hopes that her experience in the banking sector will have a positive in-
IOXHQFHRQWKHUHVHDUFKRIWKHWKHVLVµ5HVHDUFKSUREOHPVIRFXVLQJRQXQFRYHULQJD
SHUVRQ·VH[SHULHQFHRUEHKDYLRXURUZhere we want to uncover and understand a phe-
nomenon about which little is known, are typical examples of qualitative reVHDUFKµ
(Ghauri & Gronhaug 2010.) 
 
The primary method of this thesis is qualitative research in order to gain in-depth in-
formation of the Basel III financial framework and its implications on the chosen 
banks. The information is gathered by the use of secondary data, mainly the reliable 
publications by internationally recognized authorities and the researched banks. The 
primary data is creDWHGE\DXWKRU·VRZQILQGLQJVDQGDQDO\VLVFRQGXFWHGZLWKWKHXVHRI
public information, thus making this thesis transparent to any inspection. However this 
also might lead to some differencies in other studies that are based on confidential ma-
terial. 
 
Data was collected by the use of several reliable sources, mainly from the publications 
of internationally recognized financial institutions such as IMF, BIS and Sveriges Riks-
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bank to name a few. Special attention was on using up-to-date information by selecting 
sources that are current. 
 
1.2 Research Problem and Significance 
The aim of this thesis is to provide in-depth information on the Basel III framework 
and to analyze its influences on the important international Swedish banks. The pur-
pose is to map the differencies and similarities of the capital and liquidity situations of 
the researched banks and to provide some suggestions of where they need to make 
improvements to comply with the Basel III requirements. The research problem can 
be defined as what are the potential influences of Basel III framework on the banking 
industry, specifically the Swedish banking industry and Handelsbanken and Nordea. 
 
This thesis has practical significance as it provides value to the analyzed banks by 
providing information that has been collected and analyzed from different reliable 
sources. Working with this topic has also provided value for the author by enabling her 
to deepen her knowledge of the banking industry and the requirements. The thesis has 
also had a positive impact on WKHDXWKRU·VSURIHVVLRQDOGHYHORpment.  
 
1.3 Structure and Demarcation 
Thesis will first present the reasons and background information why the framework 
was created, by introducing the economical reasons and briefly presenting the previous 
Basel accords, on which the current Basel III framework has been built on. Then the 
actual Basel III framework and its different aspects and requirements are explained to 
build up the theoretical background for the financial analysis of the banks. The re-
quirements include capital and liquidity requirements as well as special criteria for the 
systemically important financial institutions and Swedish banks. Theoretical part will 
also include the scheduled implementation for the framework. 
 
In the empirical part there will be an overview of the studied banks, Handelsbanken 
DQG1RUGHDDQGDQDQDO\VLVRIWKHEDQNV·DELOLWLHVWRFRPSO\ZLWKWKH%DVHO,,,IUDPe-
work. The results will be discussed and analyzed in the final part of the thesis. This 
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thesis is focused on the Basel III effects on the Swedish banking industry and the two 
analyzed banks;; Handelsbanken and Nordea. 
 
1.4 About the Author 
The author has worked in both banks;; a 5-month-period in Nordea bank in a branch 
focusing on personal clients and the author currently works for Handelsbanken Fi-
nance. This has had an influence on the choice of the analyzed banks, as for personal 
interests it is interesting to conduct a research of banks that are familiar to the author 
by professional experience and since there are still some contacts that the author can 
use to share the information gained from this research for these two companies. The 
author has sincere interest on the economical world and the global banking industry 
and hopes this thesis can be a stepping stone for further professional development. 
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2 Reasons Behind Basel III 
2.1 Economical Environment 
There are a number of factors that lead to the financial crisis, which in then resulted in 
the decision that the existing banking regulatory requirements had not been sufficient. 
The previous Basel I and II frameworks had been inadequate to prevent the crisis and 
it was clear that some new common rules were desperately needed to stop the crisis 
from happening again in the same magnitude. 
 
The need for the Basel III regulatory framework rose from the financial crisis that 
started in the year 2007. It became evident that the problems many of the banks were 
facing were due to the insufficient liquidity risk management. Similarly Ötker-Robe et 
al. (2010, 7) also discuss the problems leading to the financial crisis, that were related to 
the governance practices and risk management systems, but they add that the supervi-
sion was not adequate in identifying and fixing these short-comings. Ötker-Robe et al. 
(2010, 5) also state that before the crisis began, there was a rise in the leverage as well 
as significant reliance on short-term wholesale funding and off-balance sheet activities. 
In addition the banks experienced problems related to maturities and increased reve-
nue shares created by complex products and trading activities. According to Ötker-
Robe et al. (2010, 5) there was also a problem with regulatory ratios. They were not 
sensitive enough to the build-up various risks. Capital also lacked quality or it was 
simply inadequate to provide a buffer. (Bank for International Settlements 2010b, 3;; 
Ötker-Robe et al. 2010, 5.) 
 
According to the Bank for International Settlements, banks in a number of countries 
had cumulated excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage. BIS also points out, agree-
ing with Ötker-Robe et al., that tKHOHYHODQGTXDOLW\RIWKHEDQNV·FDSLWDOZDVDOVRLn-
VXIILFLHQWZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQWKHEDQNV·IDLlure to absorb the trading and credit losses. 
The crisis revealed that since there was no common criteria for the capital, it could not 
been compared between different institutions. (Bank for International Settlements 
2010a, 1.) 
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The financial crisis has revealed a lot of deficiencies in the regulation of the banking 
industry. In the future the banks are required of considerably higher amounts of high-
quality capital to protect themselves against losses. Before the crisis, some banks had as 
little as 2 % of high-TXDOLW\FDSLWDORIEDQNV·ULVN-weighted assets. All together the 
banks had to have at least 8 % of risk-weighted assets. However the criteria for the 
capital was not that strict and as it turns out most of those capital reserves were not 
actually available for covering the losses in the crisis. (Vauhkonen 2010, 21.) 
 
The vulnerability of the banking industry was increased also by the calculations of the 
risk-weighted assets. There was a small requirement of own capital if at all for most of 
the risk type. This encouraged the banks to lower their capital requirements by taking 
advantage of the holes in regulations and by conducting harmful financial innovations. 
Banks among other things for example transferred their complex non-liquid financial 
instruments from their banking books to their trading books because they needed only 
a small amount of own capital for the financial instruments in the trading book. The 
risks related to these instruments were drastically underestimated. (Vauhkonen 2010, 
21.)  
 
Sveriges Riksbank (2011, 13) gives several reasons as to why banks decided to use oth-
er sources of funding and the amount of capital-funded assets gradually declined. Over 
the years banks have had substantial incentives to prefer debt financing to capital. The 
main reasons relate to the fact that banks aim to have lower costs on total capital costs 
DQGDLPWRPD[LPL]HVKDUHKROGHUV·UHWurns. Costs are normally lower with funding op-
erations through loans instead of capital for banks because lenders require smaller 
compensations for risks than shareholders, making loans cheaper. In addition banks 
can use their pre-tax profits to pay interest expenses. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011, 13.) 
 
Vauhkonen adds that because of a low amount of own capital and underestimated 
risks, many of the banks did not have the means to cover for their losses, which was 
revealed for good in the fall of 2008. The losses created by the financial crisis almost 
lead to the downfall of the entire international banking industry and in many countries 
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the banks had to rely on massive amounts of public financing to survive. In order to 
avoid the same thing from happening again the G20 countries decided to authorize the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (also referred to as the BCBS) to improve 
the Basel II regulations. The improvement was named the Basel III accords. It was 
created to amend the deficiencies of Basel II and to create completely new regulation 
instruments. (Vauhkonen 2010, 21-22.) 
 
%HIRUHWKHILQDQFLDOFULVLVLQEDQNV·FRUSRUDWHDQGUHWDLOOHQGLQJLQ(XURSHLn-
creased to a new level. The drivers of this development were among other things low 
interest rateVJHQHURXVFUHGLWWHUPVDQGDIDYRUDEOHHFRQRPLFDOVLWXDWLRQ%DQNV·DVVHWV
increased due to more lending but equity was not keeping up with the pace. Wholesale 
funding was mainly used to fund assets, leading to deterioration of capital adequacy. 
The leverage rose, as did the bank debt in relation to equity and the equity in relation 
to assets dropped. However the banks were able to increase their profitability because 
the market funding is comparably inexpensive form of funding. This would have not 
been possible to the same extent if the banks had used only equity and retained profits 
but at the same time they were facing larger risks because of this. When the crisis broke 
out it became evident that they lacked adequate capital to survive with the losses. (Sve-
riges Riksbank 2011b, 46.) 
 
2.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), founded in 1974, was created 
with the goal to provide a forum for the issues concerning banking supervisory. Alt-
hough the Committee does not actually have any formal supranational supervisory au-
thority (meaning that its decisions and regulations do not have any legal power), the 
Committee has over the years become a standard-setting body concerning all banking 
supervision. (Bank for International Settlements. 2009, 1.) 
 
The BCBS has senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks 
from all G20 jurisdictions and important financial centers, working on to develop 
guidelines and standards for banking supervision. Since the Committee does not have 
legal power itself to enforce its developments, the expectation of the Committee is that 
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the standards and regulations will be implemented by the individual authorities of each 
member country in their own national systems. (Al-Darwish, Hafeman, Impavido, 
.HPS	2·0DOOH\%DQN)RU,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HWWOements. 2009, 1.) 
 
In the upcoming years the aim of the BCBS is to develop the accounting standards 
towards an expected loss approach, update its supervisory guidance as well as to pro-
vide some incentives in the regulatory capital framework system. Fundamental reviews 
of the trading book and securization framework are also on progress. (Al-Darwish et 
al. 2011, 19-20.) 
 
The BCBS is an important institution and the creator of the Basel regulatory frame-
works. It constantly reviews and monitors the progress of the banking supervisory de-
velopments, of which the Basel III framework is the most current example. It is highly 
vital for the global financial industry to have common rules in order for it to function 
properly. 
 
2.3 Basel I and II 
To understand better how the Basel III was created and to give a short background of 
the previous frameworks that eventually lead to the development of Basel III require-
ments, presented as following is the Basel I regulatory framework that was the first of 
the Basel accords. 
 
According to Jackson et al. (1999) Basel I was created with two objectives. The first 
was to help to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking sys-
tem by motivating the international banks to boost their capital positions. The second 
was to reduce competitive inequalities by having the standard to apply to international-
ly active banks all around the world. The Basel I introduced a framework in order to 
have the regulatory capital to be more sensitive to the different risk profiles among the 
international banking institutions, to create an emphasis of the off-balance-sheet expo-
sures when assessing capital adequacy and to reduce the disincentives of having low 
risk liquid assets. (Jackson et al. 1999, 1.) 
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Basel II was then further created to add new regulations to the Basel I accord. Basel II 
is defined by its three pillars, which have been created to enhance the financial position 
of banks in case of a stress scenario. Pillar 1 consists of the requirement of the mini-
PXPRZQFDSLWDOWRFRYHUWKHEDQN·VFUHGLWULVNPDUNHWULVNDQGRSHUDWLRQDOULVNV7KH
minimum criteria of own capital required for the credit risk are influenced by amount 
RIWKHEDQN·VEDODQce sheet items carrying credit risk, the risk level as well as the tech-
iniques used to reduce the risks with for example guarantees, securities and credit deri-
vates. Pillar 2 requires that the own capital reserves are estimated to measure the ade-
quacy of them and the pillar 3 consists of the criteria for publishing the financially rele-
vant information. (Vauhkonen 2010, 22.) 
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3 Basel III Regulatory Framework 
The Basel III framework was created to futher develop the previous Basel accords with 
the objectives to improve the banks crisis tolerance abilities and to reduce the systemic 
risk. The Basel III accord aims to tighten the requirements for quality of capital, in-
crease risk-weighted assets and require higher level of minimum capital. The scope of 
Basel III is to be applied to banks that are internationally active, on a fully-consolidated 
basis. (Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 18;; Vauhkonen 2010, 23.) 
 
Ötker-Robe et al. (2010, 5) state that the main goal of the Basel III framework is to 
support the economic growth by promoting a less leveraged and less risky financial 
system, which will then become more resilient. They also mention that the aim of Basel 
III is to improve the monitoring and governance of the banking industry. Al-Darwish 
et al. (2011, 18-19) mention that the Basel III was created to push the banking industry 
to build up buffers against periods of stress with the conservation of capital. They add 
that the capital buffers could then be adjusted to economical situations in case there 
would be any signs of credit growing to be too much to handle. (Al-Darwish et al. 
2011, 18-19;; Ötker-Robe et al. 2010, 5) The adjustments of the capital buffers will be 
conducted by national authorities to fit the buffers for each FRXQWU\·V financial situa-
tion as will be further discussed later on. 
 
Ötker-Robe et al. (2010, 5) and Al-Darwish et al. (2011, 18-19) both agree that the re-
forms that are currently happening in the financial and banking industry are meant to 
improve the quality and quantatity of capital, liquidity buffers and risk assessment for 
counterparty credit exposures, which can arise from derivates, repo and securities fi-
nancing activities. According to Al-Darwish et al. (2011, 19) the reforms should in ad-
dition reduce procyclicality, meaning that the requirements should reduce the amplified 
swings of the economy. 
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3.1 Capital Requirements 
3.1.1 Pillar 1 
According to the Al-Darwish et al. (2011, 18) the Pillar 1 is related to the amount of 
capital needed to run the business and the key resources to create the available capital 
to fulfill that need. It is therefore logical that the Pillar 1 consists of requirements relat-
ed to capital and risk. According to the Bank For International Settlements (2012) the 
minimum Tier 1 capital will be increased to 4.5 % of risk-weighted assets after deduc-
tions and there will be more focus on common equity. Contractual terms of capital 
instruments are also to include a clause that will enable the private sector to resolve 
potential future banking crises easier. The clause allows that in the case a bank is 
deemed non-viable, the write-off or conversion to common shares can happen with 
the decision of a relevant authority. (Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 18;; Bank For International 
Settlements 2012.) 
 
Al-Darwish et al. (2011, 22) describe the determination of the required capital by a 
three-step process, where the amount of capital is first calculated and then classified 
into different categories. Finally the eligibility of instruments to go into the different 
categories is assessed. Al-Darwish et al. also state that although capital could some-
times be thought of merely the excess of assets over liabilities, the different types of 
capital should be taken into careful consideration, since not all capital can be described 
as equal capital. (Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 22.) 
 
According to Ötker-Robe et al. (2010, 10), in order to achieve a better loss absorption 
in a potential stress scenario, the common equity will represent a larger share of capital. 
The minimum of required common equity will increase to 4.5 % from the previous 2 
% and there will be an additional 2.5 % capital conservation buffer. This will restrict 
distribution of dividends as well as bonus payments as banks try to achieve the re-
quirement. Ötker-Robe et al. also state that the amount of intangible and accepted as-
sets, which can be added in the capital, will be limited to 15 %. Banks were expected to 
reach the revised requirements for better risk recognition and capital coverage by the 
end of 2011. (Ötker-Robe et al. 2010, 10.) 
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One of the Basel III requirements is that Tier 1 capital consists of high quality capital 
concentrating on common equity. The requirements aim to harmonize Tier 2 capital 
instruments and Tier 3, originally meant for reducing the risks related to market, is to 
be eliminated over the period of time. (Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 18.) 
 
Basel III framework introduces three tiers of capital. However according to Al-
Darwish et al. (2011, 23), the classification structure has still been simplified into two 
tiers. Tier 1 being the going-concern capital and Tier 2 gone-concern capital. Tier 1 
defines the common equity component, also known as CET, as there is a minimum 
criterion for the common equity of capital. It is also stated by Al-Darwish et al. (2011, 
23) that the classification criteria is related to issues concerning permanence, loss ab-
sorbency and flexibility with payments. The reforms have lead to that Tier 3 instru-
ments are no longer eligible capital according to the Basel III requirements. Although 
Basel II still allows it to be used to cover market risk, large exposures in the trading 
book and fixed overhead requirements. (Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 23.) 
 
Capital conservation buffer consists of 2.5 % common equity of risk-weighted assets 
with the total common equity standard being 7 µ&RQVWUDLQWRQDEDQN·VGLVFUHWLRn-
DU\GLVWULEXWLRQVZLOOEHLPSRVHGZKHQEDQNVIDOOLQWRWKHEXIIHUUDQJHµ7KHFRXQWHr-
cyclical buffer ranging from 0 to 2.5 %, consists of common equity and is imposed 
when authorities judge credit growth be the result of unacceptable build up of system-
atic risk. (Bank For International Settlements 2012.) 
 
Furthermore it is commonly known that economic activity moves in cycles, having its 
ups and downs. The financial system moves in the same pattern and the events of real 
economy influence the financial system and the opposite. Sveriges Riksbank (2011c, 
52) states the financial crisis showed that the regulations of the banks may have ampli-
fied the economic cycles and therefore it might have weakened the financial and eco-
nomic stability. This is why the new Basel III capital requirements include countercy-
clical buffers. The buffers will protect the banking industry against potential losses that 
might occur after an excessive credit growth. And they will reduce the procyclicality of 
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credit growth by neutralizing excessive fluctuations of the credit cycle. When the econ-
omy is experiencing an upturn, the substantial credit expansion will activate the buff-
ers, meaning the banks have to little by little increase their capital. This will lead to re-
ducing the risk of excessive credit growth and increasing asset prices because of the 
restricted lending. On the other hand, when there is a downturn of the economy, the 
buffer reTXLUHPHQWZLOOEHUHGXFHGOHDGLQJWREDQNV·KDYLQJPRUe available capital and 
not affecting their lending to the same extent. As a result the banks would have less 
impact on the economic cycles. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011c, 52.) 
 
According to the report by Sveriges Riksbank (2011c, 53), domestic banks which do 
not have any lending to customers abroad must follow the capital requirements within 
one year, not taking into account their size or their share of the impact on the expan-
sion of credit. However the banks, which lend to customers in other countries, the 
capital buffer will be calculated as a weighted average of the buffer levels in the coun-
tries that the bank has exposures. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011c, 53.) 
 
Since the Basel accord does not have legislative authority, the member countries have 
the responsibility of the implementation of the new requirements. Concerning the 
countercyclical capital buffers, the BCBS has agreed with the member countries, that 
each country will appoint an authority, which can decide for each quarter the most 
suitable size of the countercyclical buffer. This arrangement will enable to tailor the 
countercyclical buffer to the needs of each country. The buffer is meant to help the 
prevention of systemic risks. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011c, 55.) 
 
BIS intends that the Basel III also strengthens the capital treatment for some complex 
securitations and they require in the framework that the banks have to conduct stricter 
credit analyses of securitisation exposures to be rated by an external body. Bank For 
International Settlements (2012) adds that concerning the Basel III criteria, the trading 
book should also consist of considerably higher level of capital for trading and for 
derivates activities. Complex securitisations should also be kept in the trading book. 
BIS adds that there should be a framework of stressed value-at-risk to deal with the 
procyclicality and a capital charge for incremental risk to consider the liquidity and val-
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uate the risks related to the default and migration of unsecuritised credit products. 
(Bank For International Settlements 2012.) 
 
Capital incentives are suggested by the BIS to encourage the use of central counterpar-
ties for derivates. The framework aims to have a stronger counterparty credit risk 
framework by including tighter conditions for measuring exposure and higher level of 
capital for inter-financial sector exposures. In fact the proposal by the BCBS suggests 
that trade exposures to central counterparty will be given a 2 % risk-weight. The pro-
posal suggests also that the default fund exposures to central counterparty will be capi-
talised with the risk-based method. This enables measuring the risk of this type of de-
fault fund. (Bank For International Settlements 2012.) 
 
According to BIS, in order to control the possible system wide build-up of leverage the 
Basel III framework introduces a non-risk based leverage ratio, which has off-balance 
sheet exposures to act as a barrier to the required risk-based capital. Al-Darwish et al. 
(2011, 18) also state that a leverage ratio will provide extra protection in case of model 
risk and measurement error. (Al-Darwish, A. et al. 2011, 18;; Bank For International 
Settlements 2012.) 
 
&DSLWDOUDWLRPHDQVWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHEDQN·VULVN-weighted assets that is capital-
financed. Risk-weighted means that each asset is adjusted to its risks classified by the 
capital requirements. According to the new Basel III capital requirements, banks must 
maintain higher capital ratios, larger than a minimum of 7 % of risk-weighted assets in 
order to be able to repurchase shares or to distribute dividends to their liking. (Sveriges 
Riksbank 2011, 15.) 
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Table 1. Requirements for Capital 
  
Tier 1 Capital At least 4.5 % of RWAs 
Common Equity Tier 1 6.0 % of RWAs 
Total Capital (Tier 1 Capital + Tier 2 
Capital) 
8.0 % of RWAs 
Source: Bank For International Settlements (2010a) 
 
3.1.2 Pillar 2 
The second pillar aims to encourage banks to have a better and proper risk manage-
ment system concerning their operations and the framework sets the standards for su-
pervision of the internally-active banks. Pillar 2 has been created to capture the risk of 
off-balance sheet exposures and securitisations activities. In addition it aims to manage 
the clusters of risk and the Pillar also answers the need for sound compensation and 
valuation practises as well as stress testing. It addresses the development of accounting 
standards for financial instruments and corporate governance as an important issue of 
WRGD\·VLQWHUQDWLRQDOEDQNLQJLQGXVWU\(Bank For International Settlements 2012.) 
 
3.1.3 Pillar 3 
One of the key components of the Pillar 3 is to maintain market discpline. The frame-
work requires detailed disclosures on the different parts contributing to the regulatory 
capital as well as the reconciliation related to the reported accounts. The banks must 
also reveal how they are calculating their regulatory capital ratios. (Bank For Interna-
tional Settlements 2012.) 
 
3.2 Global Liquidity Standards 
There are two internationally harmonised minimum standards in order to for the inter-
nationally-active banks to be able to absorb shocks of the financial market in a short- 
and long-term time period. The standards for funding liquidity were created with the 
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objectives to enhance the short-term resilience of liquidity risk profile in order  for the 
banks to survive a significant stress over a WLPHSHULRGRIDPRQWKDVZHOODVWRµSUo-
mote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating additional incentives for banks 
WRIXQGWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVZLWKPRUHVWDEOHVRXUFHVRIIXQGLQJRQDQRQJRLQJEDVLVµ
(Bank for International Settlements 2010, 3.) 
 
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) was created to achieve the first objective and for 
second one, the BIS came up with the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The Net Sta-
ble Funding Ratio was intended to indicate the possible structural issues in order to 
promote a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities. That is why the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio has a time horizon of one year. (Bank for International Settle-
ments 2010, 3.)  
 
3.2.1 Liquidity Coverage Ratio LCR 
7KH/LTXLGLW\&RYHUDJH5DWLRµDLPVWRensure that a bank maintains an adequate level 
of unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash to meet its 
liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day time horizon under a significantly severe liquidity 
stress scenario---µ7KHVWDQGDrd is defined as  
 
STOCK OF HIGH-QUALITY LIQUID ASSETS   100 % 
TOTAL NET CASH OUTFLOWS OVER THE NEXT 30 CALENDAR DAYS 
 
(Bank for International Settlements 2010, 3.) 
 
Bank for International Settlements (2010, 4) discusses the assumptions that have to be 
maGHIRUWKH/&5VWDQGDUG·VOLTXLGLW\VWUHVVVFHQDULRIt is listed as following: 
x µDVLJQLILFDQWGRZQJUDGHRIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ·VSXEOLFFUHGLWUDWLQJ 
x a partial loss of deposits;;  
x a loss of unsecured wholesale funding;;  
x a significant increase in secured funding haircuts;; and 
  
16 
x  increases in derivate collateral calls and substantioal calls on contractual and 
non-contractual off-balance sheet exposures, including committed credit and li-
TXLGLW\IDFLOLWLHVµ(Bank For International Settlements 2010, 4.) 
 
3.2.2 Net Stable Funding Ratio NSFR 
7KH1HW6WDEOH)XQGLQJ5DWLRNQRZQDVWKH16)5ZDVGHVLJQHGWRLPSURYHEDQNV·
medium and long-term funding and activities, and to tackle the structural financial is-
VXHV,WZDVFUHDWHGWRVHWWKHFULWHULDµIRUDPLQLPXPDFFHSWDEOHDPRunt of stable 
IXQGLQJEDVHGRQWKHOLTXLGLW\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDQLQVWLWXWLRQ·VDVVHWVDQGDFWLYLWLHV
RYHUDRQH\HDUKRUL]RQµ7KHVWDQGDUGDLPVWRPDNHWKHEDQNVDVVHVVWKHULVNVUHODWHG
to liquidity more thoroughly by limiting the banks from relying too much on short-
term wholesale funding. The NSFR is defined as 
 
 AVAILABLE AMOUNT OF STABLE FUNDING > 100% 
 REQUIRED AMOUNT OF STABLE FUNDING 
 
 (Bank For International Settlements 2010, 25.) 
 
3.3 SIFIs ² Systematically Important Financial Institutions 
Due to the major impact the big players of the financial industry have on the entire 
global economy, the BIS has created additional requirements for the global systemically 
important financial institutions, also known as SIFIs. Although the financial institu-
tions classified as SIFIs have to comply with the Basel III requirements, they also have 
to have a higher loss absorbency capacity since they create a bigger threat to the econ-
RP\LIWKH\JHWLQWRILQDQFLDOWURXEOHµ7KHDGGLWLRQDOORVVDEVRUEHQF\UHTXLUHPHQWVDre 
to be met with a progressive Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement rang-
ing from 1 % to 2.5 GHSHQGLQJRQWKHEDQN·VV\VWHPLFLPSRUWDQFHµ,QRUGHUWR
determine the importance of a bank, the BCBS has created a methodology that takes 
into account both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the financial institution. 
The banks ranked to be on the top of the SIFIS and faced with the highest systemically 
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important bank surcharge, there could be an additional loss absorbency of 1 %. (Bank 
For International Settlements 2012.) 
 
Vauhkonen (2010, 29) states that previously the Basel II requirements tended to favour 
the bigger banks because they could use advanced methods to calculate their own as-
sets to create a requirement for a smaller amount of required capital. However with the 
new Basel III requirements, the view has changed to the direction that the bigger banks 
are required to have more capital since they pose a greater risk to the financial system. 
Vauhkonen adds that this can also be seen for example as the government of Switzer-
land has made a proposition to demand 8.5 % common equity requirement for the 
large banks in Switzerland. (Vauhkonen 2010, 29.) Other countries have also demand-
ed extra requirements for their banking sectors. 
 
3.4 Additional Requirements for Swedish Banks 
$IWHUDZLGHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHEDQNV·DGHTXDte capital requirements for them to cope 
better with potential future financial shocks, Sveriges Riksbank has analyzed the bal-
ance of the long-term benefits and the costs to the society of the higher capital re-
quirements. As a result of this analysis, Sveriges Riksbank has concluded that the Basel 
III capital requirements are too low for Swedish banks. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011, 7.) 
 
Every country has its own unique banking system and therefore the risks related to the 
banking industry are also different and the appropriate capital requirements for banks 
can vary. According to the research by Sveriges Riksbank (2011, 8), the Swedish banks 
are large compared to the size of the Swedish economy. Therefore also the conse-
quences of a banking crisis in Sweden are larger than in other countries, which have a 
smaller banking sector. In addition the Swedish banks have also a lot of operations in 
foreign countries that could be seen as a positive sign normally, but it might make it 
more difficult for the banks to handle distress, as there are more authorities and legal 
frameworks involved. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011, 8.) 
 
Moreover the Swedish banks rely more on foreign funding than comparable banks in 
other countries, which means that the Swedish banks are more vulnerable. Sudden 
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problems in the international financial market can lead to great problems for the Swe-
dish banks. In addition few large banks dominate the Swedish banking industry: Han-
delsbanken, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank. These banks are also greatly interconnected 
to one another and they lend to each other on a regular basis, which means that one·s 
problems could quickly spread to the other banks as well. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011, 8.) 
 
The Swedish government, The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority and Sveriges 
Riksbank have a common view that the future capital requirements for Swedish banks 
should have more far-rearching criteria. Both minimum and buffer requirements need 
to be higher than what the BCBS requires on a European level. Swedish authorities 
want to introduce a special capital adequacy add-on for the Swedish SIFIs and the 
planned introduction would take place in two phases from 2013 to 2015. In addition to 
this the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority is thinking of proposing an increase 
on the risk-weights for mortgage loans. (Handelsbanken 2011, 4.) 
 
3.5 Scheduled Implementation and Monitoring 
%DVHO,,,LVDQµDFFRUGµDQGLWKDVQROHJLVODWLYHSRZHUWKHUHIRUHLQRUGHUIRUWKis 
framework to be implemented globally, it relies on the domestic authorities to trans-
form the Basel III into a law or a regulation. This implementation is monitored by the 
BCBS to ensure, that the content of the laws and regulations created to put Basel III 
framework into place, correspond to the framework itself. The level and the content of 
the domestic laws are reviewed by the BCBS and reported to keep track of the Basel 
III implementation. (Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 5.) 
 
BCBS has created several levels for the monitoring and the implementation of the new 
Basel III regulations. The level 1 consists of evaluating the timely adoption of Basel III 
and its objective is to make sure that the Basel III is being transformed into a law or a 
regulation in the countries within the international timelines. The level 1 assessment 
only concentrates on the processes to implement the Basel III accord into a law and 
does not take into account the content of the domestic law. (Bank For International 
Settlements 2012b, 9.) 
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The level 2 considers the regulatory consistency and its objective is to make assess-
ments of how well the domestic laws or regulations comply with the international min-
imum requirements. The BCBS will look into the details of the rules that are not con-
sistent with the common international Basel III requirements and it will assess the im-
pact of those on the international level and in terms of the financial stability. Any lack-
ings found in the level 1 assessment will also have impact on the level 2 assessments. 
(Bank For International Settlements 2012b, 9.) 
 
The level 3 will monitor the risk-weighted assets consistency. In other words it is sup-
pose to ensure that the final outcome of the domestic law is being consistently imple-
mented throughout the banking industry of the countries. It focuses on the bank level 
of the implementation. The BCBS will review and estimate how the banks are calculat-
ing their RWAs with its two specialized expert teams. One team is focused on the 
banking book and the other on the trading book. The analysis of the teams will assess 
the consistency of RWAs in the banking book and in the trading book and the aim is 
to identify the inconsistencies in the calculations of RWAs in the banking industry, as 
well as to estimate the broad consistency. Four-grade scale will be used to put together 
all the level assessments. The four-grade scale goes from compliant, largely compliant, 
materially non-compliant to non-compliant. The scaling has been created to be in-line 
with the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.  
 (Bank For International Settlements 2012b, 10.) 
 
%&%6KDVEHJXQWKHSURFHVVRIUHYLHZLQJPHPEHUV·LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI%DVHO,,,LQ
September 2011. The coordination of policies and their implementation is very im-
portant for the success of the Basel III international implementation among the mem-
ber countries. In order to raise the resilience of the global banking sector and to ensure 
the market confidence and to avoid distorting competition, it is vital that the Basel III 
regulations will be implemented on the allocated schedule and consistently. It is also 
important that the new requirements do not hinder the growth and innovation of the 
financial industry. The monitoring is meant to give additional incentives for member 
countries that comply with the new standards within the agreed timelines. (Bank For 
International Settlements 2012b, 1;; Ötker-Robe et al. 2010, 28.) 
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Basel III is effective from January 1st 2013 but some requirements will be phased in. 
Al-Darwish et al (2011, 19) list them as following:  
x ´The Leverage Ratio must be disclosed beginning in 2015 and becomes a Pillar 1 
requirement in 2018;; 
x The Minimum Common Equity Capital Ratio reaches its ultimate level in 2015;; 
x Various deductions from common equity are phased in between 2014 and 2018;; 
x The Minimum Tier 1 Capital requirement reaches its maximum in 2015;; 
x The Capital Conservation Buffer is introduced in 2016 and reaches its ultimate level 
in 2019;; 
x Capital instruments that no longer qualify as noncore Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital are 
phased out over a 10-year horizon beginning 2013;; and 
x Minimum standards will be introduced for the LCR in 2015 and the NSFR in 
µ 
It is likely that for market reasons, that Swedish banks will be forced to comply with 
the new regulations earlier. (Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 19;; Sveriges Riksbank 2010a, 61.) 
 
Ötker-Robe et al. (2010, 18) add that the supervision has to be more intensive in order 
to prevent a new cycle of leveraging and excessive risk-taking of the banks. In other 
words, so that the banking crisis does not repeat itself. This is even more important 
during the build-up time of liquidity and capital buffers. The supervision has to proac-
tively stay alert for systemic risks, especially with the large and complex financial insti-
tutions. (Ötker-Robe et al. 2010, 28.) 
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Table 2a. Implementation Schedule of Basel III. 
 2013 2014 2015 
CET1 requirement Gradual implemen-
tation 3.5 % 
Gradual implemen-
tation 4 % 
Final implementa-
tion 4.5 % 
Tier 1 Capital  Gradual implemen-
tation 4.5 % 
Gradual implemen-
tation 5.5 % 
Final implementa-
tion 6 % 
Total Capital re-
quirement 
Final implementa-
tion 8 % 
  
Capital conservation 
buffer 
   
Phasing in of new 
deductions from 
capital base 
 Gradual implemen-
tation 20 % 
Gradual implemen-
tation 40 % 
Leverage ratio Observation Observation Publication 
Liquidity Coverage 
ratio 
Observation Observation Final implementa-
tion 
Net Stable Funding 
ratio 
Observation Observartion Observation 
Source: Sveriges Riksbank 2010a. 
 
To add more detail to the earlier listing by Al-Darwish et al. of the phasing in of the 
Basel III requirements, the above table is presented. Table 2a. shows the gradual pro-
cess of the key requirements related to Basel III framework from 2013 to 2015.   
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Table 2b. Implementation Schedule of Basel III. 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
CET1 require-
ment 
    
Tier 1 Capital     
Total Capital 
requirement 
    
Capital conser-
vation buffer 
Gradual im-
plementation 
0.625 % 
Gradual im-
plementation 
1.25 % 
Gradual im-
plementation 
1.875 % 
Final imple-
mentation 
 2.5 % 
Phasing in of 
new deductions 
from capital 
base 
Gradual im-
plementation 
60 % 
Gradual im-
plementation 
80 % 
Final imple-
mentation  
100 % 
 
Leverage ratio   Final imple-
mentation 
 
Liquidity Cov-
erage ratio 
    
Net Stable 
Funding ratio 
Observation Observation Final imple-
mentation 
 
Source: Sveriges Riksbank 2010a. 
 
Table 2b. continues to show the implementation of the Basel III requirements from 
the year 2016 until the year 2019. The gradual implementation of the Basel III should 
then be completed unless there will be changes to the schedules. 
 
3.6 The Impact of Basel III on Banking Industry 
There are a lot of consequences of the introduction of the Basel III framework. Some 
of these impacts are argued to be positive and some of them negative to the global 
economy. There has been a lot of discussion whether these new requirements are 
enough to tackle the problems the global banking industry is facing and to prevent the 
possible future problems. In the following the different views on the influences of the 
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Basel III framework on the banking industry in general will be presented and dis-
cussed. 
  
3.6.1 Increased Complexity and Possible Distortion of Competition 
The development of the Basel III has caused a hot debate over its impacts and there 
has been some discussion whether the new Basel III accord is too complex and hin-
ders the competition. Åkerholm (2012) at least critisizes the Basel III framework by 
stating that it is based on the assumption that we can objectively measure future risk 
while the truth is that in estimating them for a longer time period into the future accu-
UDWHO\LVGRXEWIXOµ$JRRGFDVHLQSRLQWWKLVIUDPHZRUNKDVQRWEHHQDEOHWRSUHGLFW
that the sovereigns would exert the most significant risk to the financial sector, as is the 
case today. On the contrary, financing of the sovereign has been seen as risk-free for 
which,  in most cases, no capital coverDJHKDVEHHQUHTXLUHGµcNHUKROP.) 
 
Åkerholm also points out that the efforts to pinpoint the objective measures of risk, 
the regulatory authorities have created complex technical risk assessment methods. 
According to Åkerholm these extremely precise methods of risk assessment can make 
banks to over-rely on them and give them a false sense of security. Once the banks 
have complied with the regulations, they might forget to use their critical thinking and 
just automatically assume that everything is fine since they have followed the technical 
UXOHVRIWKHUHJXODWLRQVcNHUKROPVWDWHVWKDWµ$VDUHVXOWRIWKLVWKHIRFXVLQWKHIi-
nancial sector has come to be concentrated on technicalities rather than economic fun-
GDPHQWDOVµcNHUKROP.) 
 
Vauhkonen (2010, 29-30) adds that lately there has been a discussion if the Basel III 
reforms are even approariate. Some known experts think that creating stricter capital 
requirements is not the correct way to do things and they have suggested to return to 
simpler methods such as the Basel I accord. The debate of the correct direction of the 
financial regulation continues on forward. (Vauhkonen 2010, 29-30.) 
 
According to the article by Brunsden (2012.a), one other concern is that the competi-
tion might get distorted if SIFIs have to face surcharges while other large domestic 
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banks get away without additional requirements since they are not operating interna-
tionally. This could cause a problem with otherwise equal banks competing in the same 
national market if only the other bank has international business. It would create an 
unequal situation for the two banks since only the other with internal business would 
have to carry a bigger capital requirement. This could even lead to negative impact on 
international activity, pushing banks to retreat back to their home markets in the fear 
of additional requirements they have to face otherwise. (Brunsden 2012.a) This is an 
interesting question also when thinking about the comparative analysis of Handels-
banken and Nordea since both of them can be considered as important banks in their 
domestic markets but only Nordea is considered as a SIFI and it will face additional 
requirements. This will be discussed further later on. 
 
Cosimano & Hakura (2011, 6-7) also bring up the issue of distorting the competition, 
since the additional capital requirements would influence the SIFIs by creating an addi-
tional tax on these institutions. This is due to the extra cost of equity leading to higher 
loan rates or to smaller return on equity. The smaller banks would benefit from this 
because they are not subject to these extra capital requirements and investors would 
prefer them. As a result Cosimano & Hakura argue that the bigger, complex banks 
would loose business to the smaller banks with simpler operations. Cosimano & Haku-
ra (2011, 6-DOVRDGGWKDWµ,IWKHDGGLWLRQDOFDSLWDOUHTXLUHPHQWVUHGXFHORDQJURZWK
E\SHUFHQWWKHQWKHLQFUHDVHLQFHQWUDOEDQNV·Solicy rates aimed at slowing an ex-
pansion would need to be modified to avoid an excessive slowdown in economic activ-
ity.µ&RVLPDQR	+DNXUD-7.) 
 
Cosimano & Hakura (2011, 6-7) also raise a concern on the lending rates, stating that 
lending rates are not expected to change hugely but that the regulations could still have 
some negative effects on them. These include the increased temptation of regulatory 
arbitrage and shadow banking. While still promising to fund their assets in case of an 
emergy, the Basel II capital requirements inspired the banks and the large financial in-
stitutions to move their assets away from their balance sheets, leading to shadow bank-
ing. Cosimano & Hakura add that in order to cope with this possible issue, there 
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should be more monitoring of the shadow-banking sector. (Cosimano & Hakura 2011, 
6-7.) 
 
3.6.2 Impacts by the Banking activities and Geographics 
It is also interesting to consider the type of banks and their geographics that might be 
most affected by the Basel III framework. Ötker-Robe et al. (2010) conducted a study 
of this with a sample group of banks located in different areas and with different oper-
ational areas. According to the research by Ötker-Robe et al. (2010, 5) the regulation 
on market risk weights will have the most impact on investment banks. This is due to 
the large share of trading and securitization activities in their operations. Universal 
banks will also be affected because they similarly have investment bank type of activi-
ties. They discovered that the core capital ratios of investment, universal and commer-
cial banks would fall around 1 %. Traditional commercial banks would experience the 
smallest effect because of their business focus is more limited. Ötker-Robe et al. (2010, 
12) conducted the analysis with a sample group that included 20 countries and 62 
banks. The banks were chosen from three regions: 15 from Asia, 33 from Europe and 
14 from North America, and they had three different business models. The main ob-
jective of the research was analyzing the impacts of Basel III on the banks given their 
different business strategies and activities. (Ötker-Robe et al. 2010, 5;; 12;; 15-16.) 
 
Geographically speaking the new Basel III regulations will have the greatest impact on 
the European and the North American banks, followed by the $VLDQEDQNVµ,Q1RUWK
America, the drop in core capital would reflect the significant impact of increased mar-
ket RWA, while in Europe the most significant impact would come from asset deduc-
WLRQVµgWNHU-Robe et al. (2010, 15) also state that this is due to the significant concen-
tration of universal banks, which have a network of important subsidiaries in the re-
gion and business operations in bank-insurance. (Ötker-Robe et al. 2010, 15.) 
 
According to Al-Darwish et al. (2011, 7) there are also different risks related to differ-
ent banking activities. For example the commercial banks, which main activities are 
related to loaning, are subject to credit risk as well as to liquidity risk in case there is 
short-term funding included. In general market, counterparty and operational risks in-
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fluence the investment, universal and commercial banks through their trading books. 
(Al-Darwish et al. 2011, 7.) 
 
3.6.3 Improved Capital, Liquidity and Lower Risk 
Arguably there are also a lot of potential positive impacts from the Basel III frame-
work. Ötker-Robe et al. (2010, 27) point out that the framework will improve the 
qualiW\TXDQWLW\DQGWKHRYHUDOOFRPSDUDELOLW\RIEDQNV·FDSLWDOgWNHU-Robe et al. 
2010, 27.) 
 
$FFRUGLQJWR6YHULJHV5LNVEDQN·VUHVHDUFK1, 16) another consequence of banks 
having more capital is that at the same time their risk-taking reduces. Higher capital 
ratios mean that the bank has to endure more costs related to capital increases, since 
capital financing is more expensive than debt financing. Higher cost of capital leads to 
less willingness to lend money to projects that are likely not to give adequate return to 
cover the higher costs. This means that the total risk-taking of banks reduces and this 
also reduces the risk of a banking crisis. In addition experience shows that banks with 
better capital ratios do not need to decrease the amount of lending as much as banks 
that have lower capital in a financial downturn. The research shows that higher capital 
ratios limit the risk of substantial shortages in the credit supply in a financial downturn 
and amplified effects on cyclical fluctuations are reduced. To conclude, higher capital 
UDWLRVOLPLWWKHEDQNV·ULVNVDQGPDNHWKHPVWURQJHUZKLFKOHDGVWRSRVLWLYHHIIHFWVRQ
the economy. (Sveriges Riksbank 2011, 16.) 
 
The research by Sveriges Riksbank about the social benefits of having higher capital 
requirements for the banking industry, suggests that a number of benefits can be 
achieved due to the new regulations. One of the most important benefits is that the 
probability of a banking crisis is reduced. This is because the capital creates a buffer 
against sudden losses. Banks that have higher capital ratios are more stabile and their 
operations are not subject to the volatilities of the economic downturns. When the 
banks have these types of capital buffers, they are more unlikely to need governPHQW·V
capital injections to help them in the case of financial problems. (Sveriges Riksbank 
2011, 15-16.) 
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3.6.4 Costs of Basel III on the Economy 
Considering the possible costs the reforms will cause, Roger & Vitek (2012) discuss the 
short- and medium-term output costs and the effects generated in the case that indi-
vidual countries would raise capital requirements. They also study the situation assum-
ing all of the countries would take action simuntaniously. The results that they found 
with the multicountry model analysis while assuming that the banks widen lending 
spreads in order to build up their capital, was that in the absence of a monetary policy 
response (interest rates are being held constant), the real market interest rate increases 
while real equity wealth drops. (Roger & Vitek 2012, 9.) 
 
Roger & Vitek (2010, 10) conclude that if there is a simultanious increase of 1 % in 
capital requirements, it would contribute to the output around 0.5 %-points in the case 
there would not be any monetary policy response. Roger & Vitek (2010) estimate that 
of this 0.5 %-points, around µ0.1 %-points reflects the international spillover effects of 
the simultaneous globaOLQWURGXFWLRQRIKLJKHUFDSLWDOUHTXLUHPHQWVµ5RJHU	9LWHN
2012, 10.) 
 
Higher capital ratios will also have potentially negative social effects. If the banks 
choose to transfer the increased costs of higher capital ratios to their lending rates and 
if at the same time the lending volumes decrease, it can lower the level of GDP. (Sveri-
ges Riksbank 2011, 16-17.) 
 
Due to the recent financial crisis, also leveraging has become an important topic 
around the world. Banks are now increasing their equity to meet the Basel III capital 
criteria. Some argue that if the deleveraging is too rapid and un-controlled it could 
threathen the recovery of the economy of Europe. However the past experience shows 
that the negative impacts of deleveraging should not cause huge problems if the other 
underlying problems of the banking sector are dealt at the same time. The consequenc-
es of deleveraging depend on the chosen strategy by the bank. If the bank decides to 
increase its capital ratio by increasing capital, it will have minor impacts on the real 
economy. On the contrary if the bank decides to dial down its lending volume to cre-
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ditworthy households and companies, this could lead to negative impacts on the GDP. 
This is emphasized if the majority of the banks perform the same act simultaniously. 
Other countries might also be affected if the banks decide to restrict their international 
operations. Deleveraging might also have negative impacts on the banks if they are 
forced to sell their assets at an unfavourable price. In this situation the banks would 
suffer major losses, which would not improve their capital adequacy but worsen it. 
(Sveriges Riksbank 2011b, 46-47.) 
 
Vauhkonen (2010, 29) also discusses the potential influences of Basel III framework, 
stating that the framework is a large reform on the banking industry, that will surely 
KDYHLPSDFWVRQWKHILQDQFLDOV\VWHP·VVWDELOLW\EDQNV·FDSLWDOEXLOG-up as well their 
operations and the real economy. Vauhkonen (2010) points out that there are various 
opinions on the impacts of the Basel III accords. The BCBS has estimated that the 
tightened regulations will have a relatively small impact on the loan pricing for the 
EDQNV·FXVWRPHUVDVZHOODVWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIORDQ2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKHQHZUHJXODWLRQV
can strengthen considerably the long-term growth of the world economy if the regula-
tions succeed in minimizing the likelyhood of new financial crisis and their costs. 
(Vauhkonen 2010, 29.) 
 
According to Cosimano & Hakura (2011, 22) it is very important to coordinate the 2.5 
% increase in capital ratios of the countercyclical capital requirement under the declara-
tion of excessive credit growth with correct monetary policies. Since this declaration 
could potentially decrease the loans of largest banks by 2.5 % it could have significant 
countercyclical impact on the economies of developed countries. (Cosimano & Hakura 
2011, 22.) 
 
Some banks have also raised concerns of the possible unintended impacts of the Li-
quidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), saying that it might encourage the banks to reduce the 
amount of loans by forcing them to reserve more cash and buy government bonds. 
Global regulations have responded by stating that they would improve the requirement 
to avoid these types of consequences. They however defend the standard by reminding 
that the reasons why Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc and Dexia SA collapsed unex-
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pectedly, was due to some extent because of they ran out of short-term funding. 
(Brunsden 2012.b.) 
 
6ZHGHQ·V)LQDQVLQSHNWLRQHQHVWLPDWHVWKDWWKHQHZOLTXLGLW\UHTXirements 
might have the biggest impact on the costs of the banks. Swedish banks have relatively 
large mortgages compared to their overall balance sheet totals and in order to meet the 
liquidity requirements, they should extend the maturity of their funding and maintain 
liquidity buffer. Finansinpektionen has estimated that the cost of maintaining a liquidi-
ty buffer and adapting to the other regulations would be around 0.15 %-points. The 
cost estimate varies between 0.10-0.20 %-points and it rises from the banNV·QHHGWR
invest a part of their borrowings in long-maturity assets with relatively low return. (Fi-
nansinspektionen 2012, 17.) 
 
Cosimano & Hakura (2011, 5) argue that the new regulations will have indirect effect 
on indirect tax on loans as well as excessive credit growth. According to their research 
about Basel III regulations· impact on banking behaviour, they found that loan rate 
and loan demand estimations would seem to imply that a 1.3 %-point increase in the 
equity-to-asset ratio would decrease loans for the 100 largest banks by 1.3 %-points in 
the long run. They add that an additional 2.5 %-point increase in the equity-to-asset 
UDWLRUHTXLUHGE\WKHGHFODUDWLRQRI·H[FHVVLYHFUHGLWJURZWK·ZRXOGUHGXFHORDQV
around 2.5 %-points in a longer time period. Cosimano & Hakura (2011, 5-6) conclude 
that these requirements would influence the lending volume of large banks in devel-
oped countries. They estimate that the lending volumes of banks would reduce on av-
erage 14.8 % in countries that were not impacted by a crisis and 4.6 % in the ones that 
were impacted by one. (Cosimano & Hakura 2011, 5-6.) 
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4 Financial Analysis of  the Banks 
The following analysis of the banks, Handelsbanken and Nordea, is based on an exten-
sive research of different reliable sources. The banks were chosen to be comparable 
with each other and because they have international activity and therefore are bound to 
follow the new Basel III regulations. The chosen banks are universal banks, combining 
the commercial and investment banking activities. 
 
The financial analysis will be conducted with a short overview on both banks;; their 
RSHUDWLRQVDQGPDLQIXQFWLRQV7KHEDQNV·FDSLWDODQGOLTXLGLW\SRVLWLRQVZLOOWKHQEH
analyzed as well as lending of the banks for the public. Finally there will be a compari-
VRQRIWKHEDQNV·VLWXDWLRQLQWHUPVRIWKH%DVHO,,,IUDPHZRUNDQGRWKHUDQDO\VLVRI
WKH6ZHGLVKEDQNLQJVHFWRUZLOOEHGLVFXVVHG7KHDXWKRU·VRZQVXJJHVWLRQVIRUWKH
banks are also presented. 
 
4.1 Handelsbanken 
Handelsbanken was founded 1871 and it is a universal full-service bank for personal 
and corporate clients. The bank has over 11,000 employees and operations in 22 coun-
tries with the main domestic markets in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and the 
UK. Handelsbanken is based on its decentralised organisation, meaning that the 
branch is the bank. The decision making is distributed to the branches so that they will 
WDNHWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHLUGHFLVLRQVPDGHLQOLQHZLWKWKHEDQN·VVWUDWHJ\7KLV
makes e.g. the customer service more efficient and creates more satisfaction. The bank 
also pays focus on its customers, not specific products. Handelsbanken maintains its 
long-term perspective and states that profitability has always been given higher priority 
than volumes. (Handelsbanken 2012a) This is reflected also on the choice of clients. 
There is a clear strategy when it comes to the selection of the new customers in Han-
delsbanken. Rather than being a mass-market bank, Handelsbanken requires that its 
borrowes are high quality and selects its customers to ensure that they fit the criteria. 
This quality requirement is never forgotten to achieve higher loan volumes or for high-
er returns. Handelsbanken also does not distribute bonuses to encourage risk-taking 
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but it has its own Oktogonen proft-sharing system, where shares are distributed evenly 
to everyone that took part in producing the results for that specific year. (Handels-
banken 2011, 8.) 
 
+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·VEXVLQHVVRSHUDWLRQVRSHUations-related risk control, central risk con-
WURODQGFDSLWDOSODQQLQJDUHDSDUWRIWKHEDQN·VULVNDQGFDSLWDOPDQDJHPHQW7KH
bank has a clear division of responsibility and each part of the business operations are 
given full responsibility of their business and risk management. Because of this distri-
bution of responsibility, there are strong incentives for high-risk awareness and pru-
dence in the business operations. Local risk control in the regional banks and other 
business areas complement the accountability of business decisions by the individuals. 
This ensures the proper level of risk-taking in an individual transaction or in local op-
HUDWLRQVDQGWKDWWKHWUDQVDFWLRQVZLOOEHLQOLQHZLWKWKH%DQN·VYLHZRIULVN-taking. 
Handelsbanken has had lower loan losses and a consistent financial perfomance com-
pared to its competitors for a long period of time. This is mainly due to the bDQN·VULVN
management actitivies. (Handelsbanken 2011, 6.) 
 
The goal of the bank is to have higher profitability than its competitors by average and 
Handelsbanken aims to achieve this goal by having lower costs and more satisfied cli-
ents than its competitors. For the past 40 years the bank has achieved its goal of having 
higher profitability and this is due to the fact the bank pays close attention on cost con-
trol and on customer satisfaction. According to the surveys, which started in 1989, the 
bank has had the highest level of customer satisfaction and in Europe the bank has 
been the most cost-effective for years. (Handelsbanken 2012a.) 
 
The bDQN·VUHWXUQRQHTXLW\KDVEHHQPDLQWDLQHGTXLWHFRQVLVWHQWO\RQDJRRGOHYHODQG
KLJKHUWKDQWKH%DQN·VFRPSHWLWRUV7KHUHZDVDGHFOLQHLQWKH\HDUVDQG
because of the global financial downturn but it has gradually increased since that and 
now maintains in a high level. The development of the bank·s return on equity is 
shown in the Table 3. below. 
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7DEOH+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V5HWXUQRQ(TXLW\ 
+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V5HWXUQRQ(TXLW\ 
Q2/2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
14.40% 13.50 % 12.90 % 12.60 % 16.20 % 23.30 % 
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Handelsbanken. 
 
4.1.1 Meeting the Capital Requirements 
7DEOH+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V.H\&DSLWDO)LJXUHV 
+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V.H\&DSLWDO)LJXUHV 
 Q2/2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Core Tier 1 
Ratio 
16.80 % 15.60 % 13.80 %    
Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio 
19.40 % 18.40 % 16.50 % 14.20 % 10.50 % 10.60 % 
Total Capital 
Ratio 
19.90 % 20.90 % 20.90 % 20.20 % 16.00 % 16.90 % 
Tier 1 Capital 
SEKm 
98,781 93,548 87,796 85,600 75,854  
Tier 1 Capital 
EURm 
11,450.6 10,589.4 10,064 8,830.07 6,597.95  
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Handelsbanken 
 
Looking at the Table 4. and graphs shown below, made to summarize Handelsbank-
HQ·VNH\FDpital figures in the recent years, we can see a positive development. Due to 
the upcoming requirements the bank has increased its capital and improved its ratios. 
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*UDSK'HYHORSPHQWRI+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V&DSLWDO5DWLRV 
 
 
Graph 2. Development of Tier 1 Capital of Handelsbanken. 
 
 
Common equity Tier 1 capital ratio was 14.1 % at the end of 2011 for Handelsbanken. 
Handelsbanken (2012, 7) estimates that the transition from Basel II to Basel III re-
quirements will reduce the common equity Core Tier 1 ratio by around 1.5-1.8 %-
points. At the end of 2nd quarter in 2012, the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio complying 
Basel III was around 14.6 %. (Handelsbanken 2011, 4;; Handelsbanken 2012, 7.) 
 
Handelsbanken experienced a strengthening of its capital situation during the year 2011 
and its earnings have been consistent. The bank also had decreased loan losses and this 
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KDGDSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHVWURQJSRVLWLRQ+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·VFUHGLWSRUWIROLR·VORZ
risk profile has lead to lower capital requirements for credit risks in comparison to oth-
er banks. The bank has prepared itself to sudden substantial losses by holding capital 
to ensure its survival even in an extreme financial shock. HDQGHOVEDQNHQ·VFDSLWDOSODn-
ning is based on assessing the capital situation to the legal capital requirement and in 
addition by conducting calculations of economic capital and stress tests. (Handels-
banken 2011, 6.) 
 
$FFRUGLQJWR+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·Vnd quarter interim report, the capital base decreased to 
SEK 106 billion because of redeemed subordinated loans valued SEK 9 billion during 
the quarter. In addition the capital ratio dropped to 19.9 % compared to 20.9 % at the 
end of the year 2011. Equity also decreased to SEK 92.7 billion due to dividend pay-
ments of the year 2011 of SEK 6.1 billion. However Core Tier 1 capital increased to 
SEK 81.9 billion and the Core Tier 1 ratio climbed up to 16.4 %. The Tier 1 ratio was 
19.1 % because of an increased volume of collateral and the fact that the new lending 
volumes were of better quality than the previous ones leaving the portfolio. In addition 
other credit risk effects had a positive impact on the Tier 1 ratio. All in all the quality of 
credit of the loan portfolio has continued to improve. (Handelsbanken 2012, 7.) 
 
One of the key assumptions of the capital adequacy regulations is that the exposures of 
the institution in question are classified into the exposure groups defined by the regula-
tions. The number of these exposure groups depend on the method of calculating the 
credit risk. 15 different exposure classes are calculated using the standard approach and 
7 exposure classes are defined by the IRB approach. Sovereign, institutional, corporate, 
retail, equity exposures and securitisations positions are divided into exposure classes 
that are calculated with the IRB model. As well as the exposures without counterpar-
ties, in other words the assets, which do not require any performance by counterparty. 
(Handelsbanken 2011, 9.) 
 
The Board of Handelsbanken decided that the bank should have a Tier 1 ratio between 
9-11 %. However this requirement will be changed intoa  higher criteria because of the 
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Basel III requirements and because of the demand of the Swedish authorities for high-
er requirements than in Basel III. (Handelsbanken 2011, 33.) 
 
4.1.2 Meeting the Liquidity Requirements 
7DEOH+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V/LTXLGLW\5HVHUYH 
+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V/LTXLGLW\5HVHUYH 
 Q2/2012 Q1/2012 2011 2010 2009 
SEKbillion 750 700 700 500 450 
EURbillion 86.9 78.3 79.2 57.3 46.4 
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Handelsbanken. 
 
Handelsbanken has in the recent couple of years increased its liquidity reserves consid-
erably. Currently the bank has a strong reserve of liquidity reserves and according to 
the bank (Handelsbanken 2011, 5-6) the total amount of the liquidity reserve covers 
+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·VOLTXLGLW\UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUPRUHWKDQWZR\HDUVZLWKRXWDFFHVVWRQHZ
PDUNHWIXQGLQJLQFDVHRIDVWUHVVHGVFHQDULR)XUWKHUPRUHGXHWRWKHEDQN·VKLVWRULFDl-
ly low tolerance of risk, stable capitalization and strong liquidity situation, Handels-
banken is well prepared to survive even more difficult market situation than what ex-
perienced during the year 2011. (Handelsbanken 2011, 5-6.) 
 
Graph 3. Development of Liquidity Reserve of Handelsbanken. 
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Handelsbanken has a strict approach to risk, which means that the bank consciously 
avoids high-risk transactions even if the return might be high. The low risk tolerance is 
maintained with a strong, sustainable risk culture, which is applied to all areas of the 
bank group. Lending is influenced by a strong local involvement. This is logical since 
the local employees are closer to their customers than any other members of the bank, 
and therefore they have the first hand knowledge of the cusWRPHUV· financial situations 
and this normally leads to lower credit risks. Concerning market risks in the banking 
operations, the bDQNRQO\SDUWLFLSDWHVDVSDUWRIPHHWLQJFXVWRPHUV·LQYHVWPHQWDQG
risk management needs and in conjunction with the bDQN·VIXQGLQJ+DQGHOVEDQNHQ
plans its liquidity in a way that its business operations are not restricted in case of dis-
ruption in the financial market. (Handelsbanken 2011, 5.) 
 
Even during the financial crisis, Handelsbanken has had a great access to liquidity. The 
bank uses its short- and long-term funding programmes to gain access to the financial 
markets. These programmes were expanded in the year 2011. To diversify the long-
term funding and to gain access to a broader base of investors, Handelsbanken issued a 
new programme in US dollars in the summer of 2011. A Part of the bDQN·VOLTXLGLW\
reserve consists of the Central Treasury·VORTLRGRWXSRUWIROLRZKLFKKDVDORZULVN
proILOHDQGLVPDLQO\FRQVLVWHGRIJRYHUQPHQWDQGFRYHUHGERQGV7KHEDQN·VOLTXLGLty 
reserve gives a high level of resistance to the potential financial market disruptions. 
(Handelsbanken 2011, 5-6) At the end of the 2nd quarter of 2012, Handelsbanken total 
liquidity reserve exceeded SEK 700 billion. Liquid assets including cash funds invested 
with central banks totaled in SEK 341 billion and the volume of liquid bonds was SEK 
98 billion. The rest of the liquidity reserve consists of unutilized covered bonds at 
Stadshypotek. (Handelsbanken 2012, 7.) 
 
Handelsbanken·s Central Treasury has the overall responsibility of the issues concern-
ing the bDQN·VOLTXLGLW\DQGIXQGLQJ/LTXLGLW\ULVNFDQEe defined as the risk were the 
bank is not able to meets its payment obligations when they fall due without experienc-
ing unacceptable costs or losses. One of the main criteria for funding operations is that 
they must limit market and liquidity risks by aiming for long-term stable growth of 
profits. In order to achieve this objective, Handelsbanken matches its cash flows be-
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tween funding and lending. This leads to minimizing the economic risks related to 
funding and enables the bank to able to determine stable and long-term internal inter-
est rates for the business operating units. (Handelsbanken 2011, 39.) 
 
Handelsbanken enjoys the continueing confidence of the PDUNHWDQGWKHPDUNHW·VDs-
sessment is that the bank has a very low credit risk in the funding market. A proof of 
this is the fact that the CDS spread, cost of insuring a credit risk on the bank, is one of 
the lowest compared to European banks. Handelsbanken (2011, 5) also states that it 
has no direct exposure and limited institutional exposure to the countries facing finan-
cial trouble but however the stress on the financial markets does impact Handelsbank-
HQ·VKRPHPDUNHWV(Handelsbanken 2011, 5;; 39.) 
 
4.1.3 Lending Volumes 
The lending volume has not been influenced because of Basel III framework so far. It 
has increased slightly over the years but there have not been any dramatic drops. 
 
7DEOH+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V/HQGLQJ9ROXPH 
+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V/HQGLQJ 
 Q2/2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Lending to the 
public SEKm 
1,632,464 1,591,128 1,481,678 1,477,183 1,481,475 1,292,988 
Lending to the 
public EURm 
183,569 180,112 169,843 152,379 112,467 136,627 
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Handelsbanken. 
 
4.2 Nordea 
Nordea is also a universal bank providing broad range of financial services for personal 
and corporate clients. The bank has operations in the Nordic countries including Fin-
land, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, as well as in Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia. The bank has around 1,400 branches and Nordea has the largest custom-
er base, of 11 million customers, than any other financial services group in the Nordic 
countries. The vision of Nordea is to be a Great European bank and the bank aims to 
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achieve this by its New Normal strategy. 1RUGHD·V1HZ1RUPDOVWUDWHJ\KDVOHDGWR
improved capital efficiency and that had a positive effect on the capital position.  
(Nordea Group 2011, 9;; Nordea 2012a.) 
 
1RUGHD·VQHWORDQORVVHVGHFUHDVHGWRDORDQORVVUDWLRRf 23 basis points improving the 
%DQN·VFUHGLWTXDOLW\LQ5DWLQJPLJUDWLRQDOVRPDLQWDLQHGSRVLWLYHLQWKHVHFRQG
half of the year and the impaired loans ratio has maintained quite the same, dropping 
to around 139 basis points. Due to increases from corporate and household segments, 
1RUGHD·VFUHGLWH[SRVXUHLQFUHDVHGE\LQ7KH%DQN·VPDUNHWULVN-taking 
activities can be described as diversified and directed to Nordic and European markets. 
,QWHUHVWUDWHULVNLVWKHPDLQGULYHURI1RUGHD·VPDUNet risk and the total market risk 
VaR was on average EUR 72 million in the year 2011. (Nordea Group 2011, 3.) 
 
In order to evaluate the bDQN·VDELOLW\WRHQGXUHDQHFRQRPLFGRZQWXUQDQGWKHSRVVi-
ble impacts, Nordea performed several internal stress tests in the year 2011. In addition 
the bank participated in external stress test by financial supervisors, central banks and 
equity analysts. Nordea also took part in the EU-wide stress test and recapitalization 
exercise coordinated by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the results 
showed clearly that the bank has a strong capital position. (Nordea Group 2011, 5.) 
 
Nordea states that it has a strong focus on capital, liquidity and risk management and 
LW·VZHOOSUHSDUHGWRDFKLHYHWKHQHZ%DVHO,,,UHTXLUHPHnts. In the near future Nordea 
will experience some changes related to these requirements on capital and liquidity. 
According to Financial Stability Board, who is responsible of making the list of the 
systemically important financial institutions, Nordea has also made it on the list of SI-
FIs and therefore it is highly likely they have to comply with the additional Basel III 
requirements. Nordea states also in its financial report 2011 that the bank has been the 
only Nordic bank listed in the 29 most important banks for the global economy by the 
Financial Stability Board. (Financial Stability Board 2011;; Nordea Group 2011, 3;; 
Nordea 2011, 7) However even if this sounds like a great thing for the bank, it means 
that they have to comply with extra requirements in terms of their capital. 
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NoUGHD·VUHWXUQRQHTXLW\KDVVWD\HGTXLWHVWDEOHWKURXJKWKH\HDUVH[SHULHQFLQJD
small drop in the years 2008-2009 and gradually improving towards the current year. 
The development can be seen in the Table 7. presented below. 
 
7DEOH1RUGHD·V5HWXUQRQ(TXLW\ 
1RUGHD·V5HWXUQRQ(TXLW\ 
Q2/2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
12.50% 10.60 % 11.50 % 11.30 % 15.30 % 19.70 % 
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Nordea. 
 
4.2.1 Meeting the Capital Requirements 
7DEOH1RUGHD·V.H\&DSLWDO)LJXUHV 
1RUGHD·V.H\&DSLWDO)LJXUHV 
 Q2/2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Core Tier 1 
Ratio 
11.80 % 9.20 % 8.90 % 9.30 % 6.70 % 6.30 % 
Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio 
12.80 % 10.10 % 9.80 % 10.20 % 7.40 % 7.00 % 
Total Capital 
Ratio 
14.30 % 11.10 % 11.50 % 11.90 % 9.50 % 9.10 % 
Tier 1 Capital 
EURm 
23.288 22.638 21.049 19.577 15.76 14.23 
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Nordea. 
 
Nordea has also great solid figures for its capital. However the Swedish government 
has demanded a higher Core Tier 1 Ratio requirement for domestically and globally 
systemically important banks. Nordea states that its Core Tier 1 Ratio is already above 
the expected requirement for 2013-14 of 10 % (excluding countercyclical buffers). This 
ratio will likely further improved with the retained profits after dividends. (Nordea 
Group 2011, 3.) 
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*UDSK'HYHORSPHQWRI1RUGHD·V&DSLWDO5DWLRV 
 
 
Graph 5. Development of Tier 1 Capital of Nordea. 
 
 
Since the internationally active banks need to maintain sufficient capital to cover their 
risks over a foreseeable future, Nordea aims to get to this goal by attaining efficient use 
of capital through active balance sheet, liability and risk category management. The 
EDQNDOVRDLPVWRLPSURYHLWVVKDUHKROGHUV·UHWXUQVZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJLWVSUXGHQWULVN
DQGUHWXUQUHODWLRQVKLS1RUGHD·VVWURQJFDSLWDODQG5:$PDQDJHPHQWSURvides the 
bank cover for unexpected losses that might occur due to risks taken by the bank. 
Nordea adds that its overall credit quality is strong due to quality clients. The portfolio 
  
41 
of the bank is well diversified by industry and geography and it has no direct exposure 
to the Euro crisis. (Nordea Group 2011, 9;; 12.) 
 
4.2.2 Meeting the Liquidity Requirements 
7DEOH1RUGHD·V/LTXGLW\5HVHUYH 
1RUGHD·V/LTXLGLW\5HVHUYH(85ELOOLRQ 
Q2/2012 Q1/2012 2011 2010 2009 
68 60.3 ? 61 35-59 
LCR 144% in Q2/2012 
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Nordea. 
 
7KHGHYHORSPHQWRI1RUGHD·VOLTXLGLW\UHVHUYHKDVEHHQFRQVLstent and it has been in 
more focus in the recent years. The liquidity buffer is made of highly liquid central 
bank eligible securities similar to the Basel III liquid assets and it amounted to 68 bil-
lion euros looking at the end of the second quarter of 2012. (Nordea 2012, 9) 
 
*UDSK'HYHORSPHQWRI1RUGHD·V/LTXLGLW\5HVHUYH 
 
 
Even with the macroeconomic recovery slowing down in the Nordic countries, 
Nordea has maintained its solid risk position as well as it has continued to have a 
strong name in the funding market and high activity in the long-term funding market. 
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The bank has an excellent acces to the international funding market and it is also LCR-
compliant. Currently the LCR of Nordea is 144%. (Nordea Group 2011, 3;; Nordea 
2012, 2;; 9.) 
 
4.2.3 Lending Volumes 
1RUGHD·VOHQGLQJYROXPHVKDYHDOVRLQFUHDVHGVOLJKWO\DQGVWHDGLO\RYHUWKH\HDUVDQG
the Basel III framework has not had a dramatic negative impact so far. The develop-
ment of Nordea·s lending can be seen in the Table 10. 
 
7DEOH1RUGHD·V/HQGLQJ 
1RUGHD·V/HQGLQJ(85ELOOLRQ 
 Q2/2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Lending to 
Public 
350.3 337.2 314.2 282.4 214.1 207.2 
Source: Investor Relations. Financial Reports. Nordea. 
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5 Comparison of  the Banks and Recommendations 
The comparison of the banks is focused on the different capital and liquidity positions 
SUHVHQWHGLQWKHEDQNV·RZQFKDSWHUV:KDWPDNHVWKLVFRPSDUison interesting is that 
the banks have to comply with different requirements. Even though they both have to 
meet the general requirements imposed by the Basel III framework and the additional 
requirements created by the Swedish government, Nordea is also classified as a SIFI 
and therefore it has higher standards to live up to. The comparability might be hin-
dered slightly because of the different methods of calculating the figures and the issue 
of currency. Most of the provided figures from Handelsbanken are given in SEK but 
for Nordea in EUR. Therefore the author has also transformed the SEK figures into 
EUR to be able to compare the figures between the banks. This currency change has 
been made with the currency rates for the publication dates of the financial reports 
where the figures have been published the first time.  
 
Table 116XPPDU\RI+DQGHOVEDQNHQ	1RUGHD·V&XUUHQWKey Figures 
 Handelsbanken Nordea 
Return on Equity 14 %  12.50 % 
Net Interest income 1,523 EURm  1,462 EURm 
Tier 1 Capital ratio 19.40 %  12.80 % 
Core Tier 1 Capital ratio 16.80 %  11.80 % 
Total Liquidity Reserve 86.9 EURbillion 68 EURbillion 
Source: Investors Relations, Handelsbanken & Nordea. 2012. 
 
As can be seen in the summary in the Table 11. in and the comparison graphs below 
made from the key capital and liquidity figures of the banks, it would seem that Han-
delsbanken has stronger figures. HandelsEDQNHQ·Vreturn on equity has stayed through-
out the studied timeline better than NorGHD·V52($OVRWKHFDSLWDOUDWLRVDUHFRQVLd-
HUDEO\VWURQJHUWKDQ1RUGHD·VILJXUHVDQGWKHOLTXLGLW\UHVHUYHRI+DQGHOVEDQNHQHx-
ceeds the one of Nordea. It goes to show that eventhough Nordea has more customers 
and volXPHVWKHTXDOLW\RI+DQGHOVEDQNHQLVEHWWHUWKDQ1RUGHD·V1RUGHDKDVVWURQJ
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capital and liquidity figures in general but by comparison it is left behind of Handels-
banken. 
 
*UDSK&RPSDULVRQRIWKH%DQNV·7LHU&DSLWDO5DWLRV 
 
 
Graph 8. Comparison of the Core Tier 1 Ratios 
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*UDSK&RPSDULVRQRIWKH%DQN·V7RWDO&DSLWDO5DWLRV 
 
 
5.1 The Main Results 
Both of the banks are well prepared for the Basel III requirements. Nordea has to 
comply with additional requirements and still its capital and liquidity position is cur-
UHQWO\ZRUVHWKDQ+DQGHOVEDQNHQ·V7KLVEHHQVDLGERWKEDQNVDUHVWDEile and strong. 
 
Sveriges Riksbank (2010a, 61) also conducted an analysis of how well the major banks 
(Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB, Swedbank) in Sweden meet the Basel III requirements. 
The results show that the Swedish banks have already achieved the new capital re-
quirements, but they have still some progress to do in order to comply with the new 
liquidity requirements. (Sveriges Riksbank 2010a, 61.) 
 
The analysis of Sveriges Riksbank (2010a, 61) shows also that in order to for the banks 
to comply with liquidity regulations, they will increase the amount of liquid assets and 
as a result, the lending rates may increase up to 10 %-points. This analysis is based on 
the assumption that the banks would transfer all of their cost increases due to Basel 
III, to their borrowers. In the case were the banks, instead of transferring their costs to 
their borrowers, decrease dividend payments to their shareholders, the increase in lend-
ing rates would not be quite that large. (Sveriges Riksbank 2010a, 61.) 
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Sveriges Riksbank (2010a, 63) analyzed how the four major Swedish banks;; Handels-
banken, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank, will deal with the new Basel III regulations. In 
terms of the capital requirements, the research was done based on the forecasts of the 
EDQNV·ILQDQFLDOUHSRUWVLQFRPHVWDWHPHQWVDQGEDODQFHVKHHWVIRUWKH\HDUV-
7KHIRUHFDVWVZHUHEDVHGRQWKHPDUNHWH[SHFWDWLRQVWKHEDQNV·KLVWRULFDO
growth and 6YHULJHV5LNVEDQN·VJURZWKIRUHFDVW'LYLGHQGSD\PHQWVZHUHH[SHFWHGWR
be 40 RIWKHEDQNV·SURILWVThe analysis of the Sveriges Riksbank concludes that the 
major Swedish banks already have Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio to achieve the Basel 
III requirements as well as the capital conservation buffer and counter-cyclical buffer 
of 2.5-%-points. (Sveriges Riksbank 2010a, 63.) 
 
Sveriges Riksbank (2010) points out that it is more difficult to analyze the effects of the 
Basel III liquidity requirements than the capital requirements. This is mainly because 
the liquidity requirements can still be changed and all of the details of the liquidity posi-
tions are not specified in the financial reports of the banks. However when the Riks-
bank conducted their analysis in 2010 of the four major Swedish banks and their posi-
tions in terms of the Basel III requirements, they found that some of the banks did not 
yet comply with the LCR requirement. Currently however Nordea has stated to comply 
with the requirement and Handelsbanken has also considerably raised its liquidity re-
serves making it highly likely also to be able to comply with this regulation. Sveriges 
Riksbank also found that none of the banks complied with the NSFR requirement but 
this can be disgarded for the moment as the requirement is still taking its final shape. 
Sveriges Riksbank suggests that the banks could improve their NSFR by changing the 
conditions for deposit accounts, decreasing their commitments and assets demanding 
stable funding and by extending short-term. (Sveriges Riksbank 2010a, 63-64.) 
 
6ZHGHQ·VIRXUPDMRUEDQNV1RUGHD+DQGHOVEDQNHQ6(%DQG6ZHGEDQNKDYHFRUH
Tier 1 capital ratios of at least 11.2 % according to Ewing (2012). All four banks reject-
HG(&%·VHPHUJHQF\FDVKDQGKDYHLVVXHGVHQLRUXQsecured debt this year. In Novem-
EHU6ZHGHQ·VJRYHUQPHQWVWDWHGWKDWLWH[SHFWVWKHIRXUPDMRUEDQNVWRDLPIRU
higher capital buffers than the Basel III requirements and to achieve these six years 
before the Basel III deadline, the year 2019. In addition for the reached core Tier 1 
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FDSLWDOUDWLRVDOORIWKHIRXUEDQNV·FUHGLW-default swaps trade at a lower price than the 
average European banks. This means that the investors are willing to pay less in case of 
default at the four banks compared to the European banks. (Ewing 2012.) 
 
7RFRQFOXGHWKHFRPSDULVRQWKHDXWKRU·VRZQILQGLQJVVXJJHVWWKDW+DQGHOVEDQNHQ
has a stronger position in terms of its capital ratios and its liquidity reserve. This is 
considered to be possible due to the concentration on high quality clientele as well as a 
conservative grip on risk management. Nordea also has strong figures and has grown 
to be one of the most important banks in its home markets. This can be seen also by 
the status of belonging into the group of SIFIs.  
 
The comparative analysis made by the Sveriges Riksbank was presented to add some 
valuable information concerning the other important Swedish banks to map a little the 
situation of the Swedish banking industry as a whole from the perspective of the Basel 
III. The results of that analysis show that the banks possess strong capital positions but 
could improve in their liquidity. Since that analysis was published, Handelsbanken and 
Nordea both have increased their liquidity reserves and are now more equipped than at 
the time of that research. Time will add clarity to the liquidity standards, LCR and 
NSFR and how well the banks can comply with them. Nordea has already stated that it 
has achieved the LCR criteria. However these standards were left to little inspection in 
the thesis due to the fact that there still can be some changes to the final criteria and 
the timeline to comply with them is set further along to the future.  
 
5.2 The Probability of Meeting the Requirements 
Nordea and Handelsbanken have achieved a lot of the Basel III requirements but there 
are still some things left open due to the fact that the framework is still under final de-
velopment. However it can be said with some confidence that these two banks are very 
likely to comply with the Basel III requirements as well as with the additional require-
ments required by the Swedish government. Nordea will also highly likely comply with 
the SIFIs requirements. The author feels this conclusion is logical due to the historical 
evidence of the stable operations and financial positions of the banks. If Handelsbank-
en and Nordea were to fail to meet these types of global standards on time that would 
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have to be the cause of great financial distress of the banks since in a sense these two 
banks are too important and strong financially to let it happen otherwise.  
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6 Conclusion 
To conclude the Basel III framework will have a lot of consequnces on the global 
banking industry. Some of them argued negative but mainly positive for the stability of 
the banking and financial field. There are a lot of requirements the banks have to take 
into consideration. There are also additional requirements for SIFIs such as Nordea 
and the Swedish government will impose also additional criteria for Swedish banks.  
 
At first this sounded a bit unlogical considering the Swedish banks are strong and the 
analyzed banks proved to have good capital and liquidity situations. These extra re-
quirements are however justified by the fact that the Swedish banks are extremely in-
terconnected with each other. The interconnectedness of the Swedish banking sector 
creates more risk to their operations. This results to a domino effect in the case some 
of the banks in the same Swedish banking sector would experience financial difficulty 
and therefore it is reasonable that there will be higher standards and criteria in terms of 
capital and liquidity requirements for these banks. The analysis has shown that even 
though the banks possess a strong position and have started to build up their capital 
buffers and already comply with the capital rules, the liquidity issues might cause some 
challenges. However it might be a bit premature to address this issue because there will 
likely be some modifications on the existing criteria for the liquidity requirements. Cur-
rently the banks have benefited from their concentration on the Nordic markets but 
this might not always be the case. Therefore the banks should be prepared for potential 
future financial shocks. 
 
In terms of the validity of the thesis, the results and information used in this project 
can be considered as reliable. This was achieved by a strict selection of sources. Only 
the internationally recognised and important financial institutions and papers were used 
to gather the information needed to analyze the effects of the Basel III requirements. 
The objectives of the thesis were to map the positions of Handelsbanken and Nordea 
and they were achieved. Although there was little numerical analysis made by the au-
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thor, the information gained from the extensive research of different reliable sources 
made it possible to make logical conclusions. 
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